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ARGUMENT
I.

UPS's Argument That UPS's Duty Ended Between the Time the UPS Truck
Hit and Damaged the Vinyl Curtain and the Day the Vinyl Curtain Fell on Mr.
Wood is Not Supported by Utah Law or the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 452.
UPS admits UPS had a duty to use reasonable care to avoid creating a dangerous

condition on property which could cause immediate injury to property users. UPS stated
in its brief "[i]f this case involved a typical truck accident, and UPS's driver had either
backed into Mr. Wood or backed into a building that immediately fell on Mr. Wood, the
analysis would be quite different." UPS Brief at 11. UPS, however, argues that its duty
disappeared at some point' after UPS damaged the building because of three facts: 1) UPS
did not own or control the damaged property and did not have the right to repair the
damaged area, 2) KNS knew of the damage and, in hindsight, negligently repaired the
damage, and 3) one week to one month elapsed between the time UPS damaged the vinyl
curtain and Mr. Wood was injured. UPS Brief at 10.
A.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 452 Supports the Woods'
Position That UPS Owed a Duty to Mr. Wood at the Time of Mr.
Wood's Injury.

UPS argues that at some point after UPS damaged the vinyl curtain, UPS's duty
"shifted" to KNS pursuant to Section 452(2), completely relieving UPS of responsibility.
UPS Brief at 9-10. Section 452 actually supports the Woods' position that UPS had a duty
to Mr. Wood up to and including the date of injury.

1 UPS does not state when its duty disappeared, just that it was gone when the vinyl
curtain fell on Mr. Wood.
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1.

Section 452 Supports the Woods' Position that UPS Owed a Duty to
Mr. Wood at the Time of Mr. Wood's Injury.

Section 452(1) states the general rule that a third person's actions will not constitute
an intervening' cause or shift duty:
§452. Third Person's Failure to Prevent Harm.
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the failure of a third person to act to
prevent harm to another threated by the actors' negligent conduct is not a
superseding cause of such harm.
Subsection (2), upon which UPS relies, discusses the "exceptional case" when the
duty will shift:
(2) Where, because of lapse or otherwise, the duty to prevent harm to another
threatened by the actor's negligent conduct is found to have shifted from the
actor to a third person, the failure of the third person to prevent such harm is
a superseding cause.
Section 452 gives two illustrations which both show UPS's duty would not shift to
KNS because of the three facts discussed above, i.e., control of property, negligence of
property owner, and time passage:
Illustrations 1.
A, the owner of a house abutting on a street in B City, employs C to
1.
dig a trench across the highway to make a connection with a sewer. C does
the work of replacing the sidewalk so negligently that it is left in a condition
dangerous for travel. A knows of this, and B City is notified, but neither
takes any steps to put the sidewalk into safe condition. Several weeks
after C has completed the work, D, walking on the sidewalk at night, and
without any negligence of his own, is hurt by a fall resulting from the bad
condition of the sidewalk. The failure of A, and of B City, to have the
sidewalk repaired makes both subject to liability to D, but is not a
superseding cause relieving C of liability to D.

2

The cases often use the teen "superseding" and "intervening" interchangeably. For
purposes of this reply, the Woods will use the term "intervening cause".
2

Id., Illustration 1 (Emphasis added).
In Illustration 1, C digs a trench but negligently replaces the sidewalk. D is
subsequently injured by the "bad condition of the sidewalk." In our case, UPS damaged
the KNS vinyl curtain at docking bay B which eventually fell on Mr. Wood. In Illustration
1, several weeks passed between C's original negligence and D's injury. In our case, one
week to a month passed between UPS's original negligence and Mr. Wood's injury. In
Illustration 1, the injury occurred on a sidewalk over which C had no control after it
finished its work. In our case, the injury occurred on a site over which UPS had no control
after it damaged the building. Finally, in Illustration 1, A, the owner of the property, and
B, the city, knew about the danger but did nothing "to put the sidewalk into safe condition."
In our case, KNS knew about the damaged vinyl curtain but did not properly fix it.
Illustration l's fact pattern considers all the facts cited by UPS (control of property,
negligence of property owner, and time) and rejects UPS's argument.
Illustration 3.
3.
The A Railroad Company negligently sets fire to the timber land of B,
in a state in which, at common law or by statute, it is the duty of a landowner
to use reasonable care to prevent a fire, no matter how set, from spreading to
adjacent land. B, knowing that the fire has been set, either makes no
effort to prevent its spread or fails to exercise reasonable care in making
his efforts effectual. The fire spreads to the land of C. The failure of B to
perform his duty is not a superseding cause which relieves the A Railroad
Company from liability to C.
Id., Illustration 3 (Emphasis added).
In Illustration 3, A Railroad Company started a fire on land over which the A
Railroad Company had no control. B, the landowner, had a duty to use reasonable care to
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prevent the fire from spreading to C's land. Under this illustration, B, "knowing that the
fire has been set, either makes no effort to prevent its spread or fails to exercise reasonable
care in making his effort effectual." Section 452 Illustration 3 recognizes the "failure of B
to perfoiin his duty is not a superseding cause which relieves the A Railroad Company
from liability to C."
Illustration 3's fact pattern is important because it looks at two of the facts cited by
UPS control of property and negligence of property owner—and rejects UPS's argument.
UPS's reliance on the split (2-1) decision in Braun v. New Hope Township, 646
N.W.2d 737 (S.D. 2002)3 is also misplaced. In Braun, the court used a different standard
for assessing intervening cause than applies in Utah, stating that a subsequent negligent act
would constitute a superseding cause unless the act was "reasonably foreseeable." Id. at
741. Utah requires the subsequent act be "extraordinary." See Woods' Opening Brief at
16-17; Infra, Part II. Moreover, as discussed in Section II, our case facts are different.
2.

Section 452 Should not be Used to Define a Plaintiffs Initial Duty.

UPS's attempt to pigeon hole RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 452(2) as a
"duty" provision is also misleading. Section 452 is housed under subchapter "Title C.
Superseding Cause," which in turn is housed under Chapter 16, "The Causal Relation
Necessary to the Existence of Liability for Another's Harm." Other courts which have
analyzed and applied this section have explained that Section 452 primarily involves the
issue of intervening causation, not duty formation. See Filer v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 994

'The dissenting justice in Braun believed the superseding cause question was one for the
jury to determine. Id., at 744.
4

F.Supp.2d 679, 690, 692 (holding that the defendant's reliance on §§ 442 and 452
"confuses the issue of existence of a duty with excuse of the breach of that duty based on
the availability of an affirmative defense."). Ultimately, the practical difference between
intervening cause and so-called "duty shifting" is negligible. The Woods analyze
intervening cause in Section II, below.
B.

UPS's Analysis of the West Factors Do Not Support UPS's Position That
UPS Did Not Have a Duty to Mr. Wood.
1.

A Court Must Use the West Factors to Determine Duty, not Section
452.

UPS argues that "section 452 is consistent with the general framework that Utah
courts use to determine whether a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff." UPS Brief at 11.
Such a statement is incorrect.
"In negligence cases, a duty is 'an obligation, to which the law will give recognition
and effect, to confoim to a particular standard of conduct toward another."' B.R. ex rel.
Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11,115 (citation omitted). "The question of whether a duty exists
is a question of law." Smith v. Robinson, 2018 UT 30, If 8, 422 P.3d 863, 865 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Utah courts determine duty on a "broad, categorical level" for a given class of
defendants, not on the case-by-case basis as argued by UPS. West, 2012 UT 11, ¶ 23. West
made this clear: "[d]uty determinations should be articulated in 'relatively clear,
categorical, bright-line rules of law applicable to a general class of cases.' The duty factors
are thus analyzed at a broad, categorical level for a class of defendants." Id. (citation
omitted).
5

Section 452, on the other hand, requires a factual analysis to determine whether the
legal principles outlined in Section 452 apply. That is, a fact finder must determine whether
there are enough "exceptional" facts for a defendant's legal obligation to be terminated by
a subsequent party's actions. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 452, comment d & f.
This is similar to Utah's intervening cause test, explained in Section II.
2.

The West Factors Establish that UPS Owed a Duty to Mr. Wood to
Use Reasonable Care to Avoid Creating a Dangerous Condition on
KNS's Property Which Could Injure Mr. Wood. This Duty Covered
Mr. Wood at the Time of his Injury.
a.

Affiimative Act.

The most important factor in finding a duty focuses on whether the action involves
an affirmative act. An entity's affiimative action normally carries a duty to use reasonable
care. In this case, UPS's duty arises out of UPS's affiuivative act of backing its trailer.
Hence, UPS had a duty to use reasonable care to avoid creating a dangerous condition on
KNS's property which could injure Mr. Wood.
UPS claims this factor is less important because UPS's affirmative act involved a
building it did not control. UPS Brief at 11-12. UPS provides no legal support for this
position.
b.

Special Relationship.

The Woods admit they did not have a special relationship with UPS, but the lack of
a special relationship does not eliminate UPS's duty of care. Drivers do not have a special
relationship with other drivers on the road, but their duty to use reasonable care in driving
their vehicles is not somehow terminated.

6

c.

Foreseeability.

UPS recognizes UPS owed a duty to Mr. Wood if the injury had been immediate.
UPS Brief at 12. However, UPS argues that the foreseeability factor weighs in UPS's favor
because 1) there was a delay of "one week to one month" between UPS negligently
damaging the building and Mr. Wood's injury, 2) UPS caused a dangerous condition which
KNS had an independent duty to fix, and 3) UPS had no control over the property nor could
UPS fix the damage. UPS Brief at 12.
An analysis of each of these facts actually strengthens the Woods' position that a
duty existed.
i.

It is Foreseeable That an Incident May Lead to an Injury
Many Months After the Incident Occurred.

"Whether a harm was foreseeable in the context of deteanining duty depends on the
general foreseeability of such haiiii, not whether the specific mechanism of the harm could
be foreseen." Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc., 2009 UT 44, ¶ 20, 215 P.3d 152. Utah
courts have long recognized that it is foreseeable that an incident can cause injury even if
there is substantial time passage between the incident and the injury. For example, courts
universally recognize it is foreseeable that a defective product can cause injury many
months, if not years, after a defendant manufactures a defective product and places it into
commerce. Courts also recognize it is generally foreseeable that defective construction can
cause injury many months, if not years, after a defendant defectively builds a structure.
It is for this principle that the Woods cited the Holcombe case. Holcombe v. Nations
Banc Fin. Serv. Corp., 248 VA 445, 448, 450 S.E.2d 158 (1994). Holcombe demonstrated
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that the passage of time did not detract from the foreseeability of eventual injury. The
court in Holcombe recognized it was foreseeable that someone would get injured at a later
point in time from the negligent placement of "partitions" many months before. Similarly,
it is generally foreseeable that UPS's structural damage to another's building, just like
structural damage caused by defective construction, could injury someone in the future.
See Skillingsberg v. Brookover, 484 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Utah 1977) ("[W]here there is proper
proof of proximate causation, remoteness of time alone will not ordinarily prevent
imputation of liability for a subsequent injury to a prior act of negligence.")
UPS argues imposing a duty on UPS would mean UPS "would owe an endless duty
for any injuries resulting from the condition, despite the party's inability to correct or warn
of the hazard . . ." UPS Brief at 15. This argument is wrong.
A jury and the court are well equipped to handle this situation using proximate
cause. A jury, under its fact-finding responsibilities for proximate cause, is instructed to
consider whether "the person's act or failure to act could be foreseen by a reasonable person
to produce a halm of the same general nature." MUJI 2' Ed. CV209 (defining "cause").
If an injury is so far removed from a breach of duty—including through the passage of
time—a jury can make a finding of no proximate cause. Utah already prevents "endless
liability" through application of proximate cause. See also Infra, Part II.
Finally, UPS's position goes against Utah's long-time recognition of similar tort
duties. Utah law recognizes a manufacturer has a duty even if the injury or damage occurs
1) many years after the product's defective design/manufacture, and 2) when the product
is no longer under the manufacturer's control. E.g., Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armoc Steel
8

Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979) (manufacturer of defective steel joists held strictly liable
for roof collapse which occurred three months after building completed). Utah law
recognizes a contractor has a duty even though the injury from defective constructions
occurs 1) many years after the construction and 2) when the structure is no longer under
the control of the contractor. See Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1985)
(contractor potentially liable for injury that occurred at least 4 months after alleged
defective construction of apartments).
ii.

It is Foreseeable That a Subsequent Actor Might Fail to
Properly Fix a Damaged Building.

The key focus on foreseeability is on whether structural damage to the building can
generally lead to an injury to a party in that building. See Normandeau, 2009 UT 44, ¶ 20.
Here, it is common knowledge that a damaged or compromised building could injure
people in, and particularly underneath, that structure. Moreover, it is equally foreseeable
that an owner of the property may not properly fix the damaged building part. See infra
Section II, B.
iii.

It is Foreseeable That UPS's Actions Could Injure
Someone on Property Not Owned or Controlled by
UPS.

UPS recognizes it is foreseeable that UPS hitting someone else's building could
cause immediate injury to someone on or in that building. UPS Brief at 11. Hence, UPS's
argument that the injury occurred on someone else's property does not support UPS's
argument here on foreseeability. Moreover, Utah case law recognizes that it is foreseeable
that defective construction of a building can cause injury to someone in the future. See
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Williams, 699 P.2d at 729 (contractor potentially liable for injury to plaintiff even though
contractor had finished work and plaintiff occupies apartment).
d.

Public Policy Considerations.

The Woods acknowledge this factor cuts both for and against imposing a duty. UPS,
as the original tortfeasor, was in the best position to prevent injury in the first place if it
had simply followed the proper rules for backing. KNS, as the observer of the damaged
bracket system, also had an opportunity to fix the problem and prevent the injury. Utah's
comparative fault statute allows Mr. Wood to pursue a remedy against both UPS and KNS.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-5-817 to -823. A jury gets to allocate fault between both
tortfeasors.
e.

Other Policy Considerations.

Other policy considerations cut in favor of imposing a duty on UPS.
First, "the public policy behind tort law is to hold tortfeasors accountable for harms
occasioned by their fault. . . . Accordingly, as between an innocent party and a negligent
tortfeasor, public policy requires that any loss should be borne by the tortfeasor."
Normandeau, 2010 UT App 44,114. UPS does not meaningfully dispute this point. UPS,
as the tortfeasor, should be responsible for its role in injuring Mr. Wood, the innocent party.
Second, overtime Utah has been "drift[ing] away" from using intervening cause as
a matter of law and instead letting these cases go to the jury. Harris v. Utah Transit
Authority, 671 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah 1983) (noting the "strong drift away" from finding
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superseding cause as a matter of law in automobile collisions).4 Our legislature's
enactment of the Utah Comparative fault statute, which requires juries to allocate fault
between the parties, only reinforces this policy.
f.

The Browning Case is Distinguishable.

UPS cites to De Jesus Adorno v. Browning Ferris Indus. of Puerto Rico, Inc., 992
F. Supp. 121, 125 (D.P.R.), affd (citation omitted), arguing the court found no duty on
"similar facts". UPS Brief at 14. This case is distinguishable.
In Browning, a BFI garbage truck hit and damaged a condominium retaining wall
which housed the condo's garbage dumpster. BFI paid to repair the wall, which was
completed within several weeks. The contractor who did the repair left a hole in the ground
directly behind the rebuilt wall which injured the plaintiff 5 years afterwards as she was
throwing her garbage into the dumpster. Id. at 122-123. BFI is distinguishable on two
factual grounds. First, the contractor hired by BFI created the dangerous condition, not BFI
itself; in our case, UPS's truck directly hit and damaged the overhead curtain assembly,
causing the dangerous condition. Unlike in BFI, UPS's direct actions caused the vinyl
curtain to fall on Mr. Wood. See Wood's Opening Brief at 12. Second, the injury in BFI
occurred 5 years after the dangerous condition was created; in our case the dangerous
condition existed for 1 week to 1 month.
C.

The Woods' Reliance on The Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 383 and 385
Is Appropriate in Defining UPS's Duty.

The lower court actually recognized at the hearing that its ruling on legal duty and
causation might get overruled: "I still am not convinced that legally UPS should be on the
hook. But I appreciate it's a very close legal question, and the Utah Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals may disagree with me." R at 2229.
4
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1.

Section 383 Applies.

UPS argues Section 383 cannot be read to cover UPS's actions and cites Hill v.
Superior Prop. Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 2013 UT 60, 321 P.3d 1054.
Hill supports the Woods' position. The court in Hill, recognized Section 383
"reaches only 'physical harm caused' by affiuinative `act[s]' or `activit[ies]' actually
carried out by the independent contractor." Id at 1135 (citing section 383) (alteration in
original). "It does not impose liability for mere conditions on the land." In Hill, the
plaintiffs sued a landscaper for failing to remedy tree roots on the property it maintained.
The landscaper did not create the tree root problem, nature did. In other words, because
the landscaper did not affianatively create the condition it therefore had no responsibility
to remove the roots.
In our case, UPS through the "affianative act" of negligently hitting KNS's
building, affirmatively created the damage which eventually lead to Mr. Wood's injury.
The Woods' reading of Section 383 is entirely consistent with Hill.
UPS also argues that Section 383 only "applies to persons who have the ability to
exercise control of the premises similar to the owner's control." UPS Brief at 16. UPS
cites no support for this broad premise and such a restrictive reading is not in the text of
Section 383 or its comments.
2.

Section 385 applies.

12

UPS suggests that Section 385 only applies to the "liability of a contractor for
negligence in creating/constructing structures that create dangerous conditions on the
property of another." UPS Brief at 16. Such an argument should be rejected.
First, UPS provides no support for this statement.
Second, the text of Section 385 does not limit itself to "construction" cases. Instead,
comment (b) states it applies "to any person who on behalf of the possessor of land erects
thereon a structure or creates any other artificial condition." Comment (c) indicates this
Section applies to a servant or independent contractor who "otherwise changes [the land's]
physical condition." Here, UPS created a dangerous condition upon the land when it
backed hard into the KNS building, compromising the building's structural integrity.
II.

A Jury Must Decide Whether KNS's Actions Constitute an Intervening
Cause, Not the Court.
The Woods and UPS agree that whether KNS's actions constitute an

intervening cause is a factual question turning on the case's facts. The difference is
the Woods believe that decision should be made by a jury, while UPS believes the
judge can take the issue from a jury.
UPS's argument ignores both the legal standard and the facts.
A.

KNS's Acts Can Only Be an Intervening Cause if KNS's Acts, in
Hindsight, Can Be Described as "Extraordinary".

Utah courts have set a very high bar for when the original tortfeasor can be
relieved of liability. Such a shifting of liability may only occur when the subsequent
act "was unforeseeable and may be described with the benefit of hindsight, as
extraordinary." Ste, ensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 488 (Utah Ct.
13

App. 1991) aff'd 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Justice Lee in his dissenting opinion in Thayer v. Washington County Sch.
Distr., 2012 UT 31, 285 P.3d 1142,5 stated that under Utah law another actor's
subsequent negligence will only be an intervening cause if "a reasonable man
knowing the situation would regard the subsequent negligence as 'highly
extraordinary' and not a 'non ral consequence' of the situation created by the
authorization." Id., ¶ 62 (quoting Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217,
219 (Utah 1983)).
Extraordinary is defined in the dictionary "as very unusual or remarkable."
B.

KNS's Actions, in Hindsight, Were Reasonably Foreseeable and
Certainly Not "Extraordinary".

UPS's analysis should focus on the facts of the case. UPS, however, does
not do that; UPS, in its brief, recites three facts and then in conclusory fashion, states
that KNS's actions were "unforeseeable and highly extraordinary". UPS Brief at
20-21. UPS then cites a number of cases from non-Utah jurisdictions in an attempt
to persuade the court.
An examination of these facts shows the district court erred in removing this
case from a jury. An examination of the cases cited by UPS show these cases do
not control.

The Woods in their initial brief mistakenly cited Thayer as though it was the court's
opinion. However, the Thayer cite referenced in the Woods' initial brief (Woods Initial
Brief at 17) was from Judge Lee's dissent where he cited the Harris case, which, in turn
discussed the "highly extraordinary" standard. The Woods' counsel apologize for this
mistake.
5
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1.

KNS's Actions Were Reasonably Foreseeable and Not
Extraordinary.
a.

Fact One.

On the day UPS crashed into the KNS building, a KNS employee saw that
the UPS truck had damaged the concrete holding the vinyl curtain. The KNS
employee saw that one or two bolts holding the vinyl curtain had fallen out of the
concrete onto the floor and one or two bolts had loosened. The KNS employee
tightened the one or two bolts. After tightening the loose bolts, the KNS employee
observed that 14 of the 16 bolts still secured the vinyl curtain. He then concluded,
based on his observation, that the repair was "secure enough at least for [his] liking."
UPS Brief at 3-4, 20; Woods' Initial Brief at xiii—xvi.
A jury could find the KNS employee's actions here were not only reasonably
foreseeable but expected. A jury could foresee a KNS employee would examine
the damage caused by the UPS truck. A jury could expect the KNS employee might
try to repair the damage by tightening the bolts. After the repair, the KNS employee
observed that the vinyl curtain was still secured by at least 14 of the 16 bolts and
that the bracket was "secure enough for [his] liking." A jury could foresee a KNS
employee would perform no further repairs after thinking he had fixed the bracket,
especially when 14 of the 16 bolts holding the bracket were still in place and the
vinyl curtain was still in place.
In sum, the KNS employee's actions in trying to fix the bracket were not so
"extraordinary" to allow the court to remove this issue from a jury.
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b.

Fact Two.

On the day of the incident, shortly before the vinyl curtain fell on Mr.
Wood, Mr. Kelly, the Vice President of KNS, saw approximately one foot of the
vinyl curtain hanging down from the concrete about an inch and a half, but he took
no action. Mr. Kelly stated two separate reasons for not acting at that precise
moment: 1) his belief that no one would be working underneath the partially
detached vinyl curtain, and 2) his perception that the vinyl curtain would not fall.
He specifically testified he took no action "because no one should have been there
and I didn't think that there was any risk of it hanging down because . . . . there's a
lot of bolts holding it . . . I never would have thought it would have fallen." UPS
Brief at 4 & 20; Woods Initial Brief xvii.
A jury could find Mr. Kelly's actions reasonably foreseeable. A jury could
foresee Mr. Kelly taking no immediate action in connection with the partially
detached vinyl curtain because Mr. Kelly thought no one would be working under
the vinyl curtain that day. A jury could also foresee Mr. Kelly's taking no action
because he perceived that the vinyl curtain would not fall. Mr. Kelly testified
"there's a lot of bolts holding it." Finally, a jury could also foresee Mr. Kelly taking
no action because humans procrastinate.
Mr. Kelly's actions were not so "extraordinary" in hindsight to allow the
court to remove this issue from a jury.
c.

Fact Three.
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After Mr. Wood's injury, while Mr. Wood was recovering in the break room
and having blood washed off his face, Mr. Wood heard an unidentified KNS
employee state that he/she "was sorry," knew the bracket was going to fall, and they
should have "taken care of it." UPS Brief 5, 20; Woods Initial Brief at xvii.
A jury could see that this statement as apologetic, rather than affirmative
evidence that the KNS employee knew the bracket was going to fall.
But even if the jury believed this statement was something more than an
apology, a jury could also reasonably foresee that a KNS employee would fail to fix
the problem before it fell on Mr. Wood. People procrastinate. There is no
infofination about when this KNS employee discovered the problem or what the
employee intended to do. Even under the most favorable inference to UPS (which
should not be done for purposes of summary judgment), a jury would see a KNS
employee with self-proclaimed knowledge of the danger procrastinating fixing the
vinyl curtain, which up until Mr. Wood's injury, had not actually failed. A jury
could easily view this as a reasonably foreseeable consequence of UPS's actions.
This KNS employee's actions were not so "extraordinary" so that the court
should remove this issue from a jury.
d.

UPS's Argument Leads to Unacceptable Consequences.

UPS, in essence, argues a property owner's failure to properly fix a known
problem will always constitutes an intervening cause. Such an analysis has far
reaching consequences. For example, a surgeon's negligent failure to fix an obvious
broken bone from a car collision would, under UPS's analysis, be an intervening
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cause barring any claim against the negligent driver who originally caused the
injury. A landlord owner's failure to fix a contractor's construction defect would
under UPS's analysis be an intervening cause baring any claim against a negligent
contractor. This is directly contrary to Williams v. Melby, which demonstrated that
it was a jury question whether or not a contractor was liable for a tenant's injury
allegedly caused by defective window construction. 699 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1985).
e.

The Woods and UPS are Entitled to Have a Jury
Resolve the Intervening Cause Issue.

The parties' right to a jury trial is "a basic principle of our system that cannot be
allowed to eroded by improper intrusions on the jury's prerogative." Harris, 671 P.2d at
220. The Woods are entitled to have a jury resolve this case. The Woods should be allowed
to show the jury how KNS's actions, although not ideal, were not "extraordinary." UPS is
afforded the same right. UPS can use the facts above and other facts, if it has them, to try
to argue to a jury that KNS's actions were so extraordinary that UPS should bear no
responsibility.
2.

Utah Cases Support Sending this Case to the Jury.

The Utah Supreme Court in Harris held that a following driver's own negligence in
a car collision case could not be an intervening cause simply because the following driver
saw the bus in front but still failed to avoid it. In Harris, the court recognized that a jury
could find the bus contributed to the collision if it stopped too rapidly or "failed to drive
out of the lane of traffic, or had faulty brake lights." Harris, 671 P.2d at 220. The court
recognized "a momentarily inattentive driver would not have been so 'extraordinary' as to
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be unforeseeable." Id. The Court, referencing the existence of the Utah Comparative Fault
Statute, stated the jury should allocate fault not the court. Id. at 222. Similarly, in this case,
UPS has acknowledged for purposes of this motion it negligently created the dangerous
condition. A jury could conclude that KNS's failure to fix it properly "would not have
been so 'extraordinary' as to be unforeseeable. Id. A jury using the comparative fault
statute must make the allocation not the court.
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Melby also supports the Woods'
position. 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985). In this case, the defendant Trayner built an apartment
building which was eventually owned by the other defendants, the Melbys. The plaintiff
moved into one of the apartments on September 1980. Four months later, the plaintiff fell
though the apartment window when she awoke one night disoriented. The plaintiff sued
both the contractor, Trayner, and the apartment owners, the Melbys, claiming the design
of the apartment window created an unreasonable risk to an occupant's safety. The lower
court granted summary judgment for both defendants.
On appeal, the apartment owners claimed the plaintiff knew about the window
design and plaintiff had placed her bed next to the window. The defendant owner claimed
that this conduct "was an intervening proximate cause that superseded whatever cause may
have flowed from their negligence." Id. at 728. The Utah Supreme Court, citing Harris,
reversed summary judgment in favor of the apartment owners, stating "[t]he issue of what
constitutes a superseding cause cannot be determined by the simplistic formula that the
cause which occurs last in time is, as a matter of law a superseding cause." Id. The court
also reversed summary judgment in favor of the contractor, holding "[w]hether [the
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contractor] was negligent in the construction of [the apartments] and, if so, whether his
negligence was greater than that of the plaintiffs are questions for the jury." Id. at 729.
This case is significant because our Supreme Court sent the case back to the jury
despite the existence of three facts similar to those argued by UPS here: 1) the plaintiff had
inspected the apartment numerous times, knew the location of the window, and voluntarily
placed her bed next to the window; 2) the contractor no longer had control over the
apartments; and 3) the injury occurred many months after the apartments were finished and
turned over to the occupants.
3.

The Cases Cited by UPS Do Not Support A Utah Court Pulling the
Intervening Cause Issue From a Jury.

UPS's main focus is not on the Utah standard or on the facts. UPS's main focus is
in scouring the country for cases with seemingly similar fact patterns and then presenting
them to the court, arguing that since these courts have found intervening cause as a matter
of law, so should this court. Each of these cases are distinguishable upon the facts and/or
the standard applied.
UPS first cites to Lynch v. Norton Constr. Inc., a Wyoming slip and fall case. 861
P.2d 1095, 1099-100 (Wyo. 1993). In Lynch, a school custodian slipped and fell on an icy
school sidewalk which had originally been installed by subcontractor Norton. For over
one year after the school district accepted Norton's work, the school district knew of the
ice problems on the sidewalk. In fact, the school district submitted a work order to fix the
problem one year before the accident. The Wyoming court held that the school district's
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negligence in failing to repair the "obvious dangerous condition of the sidewalks" was an
intervening cause, relieving Norton of liability. Id. at 1099.
This case is distinguishable both legally and factually. First, in Norton, the school
district knew of the dangerous condition for over one year before the injury and had
received numerous complaints. In our case, between 7 and 30 days had passed and two
KNS employees believed there was no immediate danger from the vinyl curtain. Second,
under Utah law, UPS must show KNS' s actions were "extraordinary". The Wyoming court
did not apply that test. Id. at 1100.
UPS next cites to Seely v. Loyd H. Johnson Const. Co., 220 Ga. App. 719, 722, 470
S.E.2d 283 (1996) (superseded by statute on other grounds). In Seely, a recent homebuyer,
Ms. Seely, slipped and fell in a pool of water in her bathroom after a pipe leaked water
onto the floor. The carpentry subcontractor initially caused the leaky pipe when he drove a
nail through a pipe. A plumber was hired to fix the leak, but that repair failed. Ms. Seely
then slipped on the water from the leaky pipe. The court granted the carpentry
subcontractor's motion on the grounds that the subsequent repair was the proximate cause
of Ms. Seely's injury.
This case is distinguishable because the Seely court applied a standard which is not
followed in Utah and has in fact, been rejected. In Seely, the court recognized that the
second negligent act will be the proximate cause over the first negligent act simply by the
fact that the second actor knew about the prior negligent act. Seely at 287. The Utah
Supreme court in Harris expressly rejected that the first actor can be relieved of negligence
simply because the second actor is aware of the first party's actions. Harris, 671 P.2d at
21

222. In Utah, a subsequent act will only be an intervening cause if the subsequent act is
"in hindsight extraordinary".
UPS next cites to Walsh v. Israel Couture Post, No. 2274 V.F.W. of the U.S., a
Rhode Island premises liability case. 542 A.2d 1094 (R.I. 1988). The Woods acknowledge
the VFW case is similar to this case, but there are important differences. In VFW, the
property owner knew about the damage but did nothing. In this case, KNS knew about the
damage and one of the employees retightened two loose bolts to the point where he felt the
vinyl curtain was secure enough, being held with 14 of the 16 total bolts still in place.
Moreover, in this case, both of the identifiable witnesses have provided specific reasons
why they did what they did. These are different facts a jury must consider when
determining whether the subsequent acts were "extraordinary." Finally, the Walsh court
does not apply the Utah standard that the intervening act must be "extraordinary".
Of note, eight years after the Walsh decision, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
reached the opposite result in a case called Pantalone v. Advanced Energy Delivery
Systems, Cinc., 694 A.2d 1213 (R.I. 1997). In that case, the owner of the building hired a
service technician (Smeltz) to fix an ice machine. The service technician fixed the ice
machine but was unable to fix the nearby plug, claiming he did not have the electrical
experience. The service technician told the owner he would need to call an electrician.
The service technician then lent the owner an electric cord so the owner could attach the
ice machine to a distant plug. The owner's business caught on fire 16 days later because
of an overheated extension cord. The service technician claimed he was absolved from his
negligence because 1) the owner knew about the problem and had failed to summons an
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electrician to fix the nearby plug and 2) the owner continued to use the an extension cord
for 16 days. Id. at 1215.
The trial court sent the case go to the jury and on appeal the Rhode Island Supreme
Court agreed the intervening cause issue was one for the jury:
We are of the opinion that the trial justice did not err in deciding this motion.
The lending of the extension cord for this use could certainly have been found
to be negligent. Whether it was reasonably foreseeable that Pantalone
might have used this extension cord for a considerable period without
implementing the repairs recommended by Smeltz could not be
determined as a matter of law. This was a question of fact for the jury.
Id. at 1216 (emphasis added).
The other cases cited by UPS are also distinguishable.
In Sisco v. Bocce Mfg., Inc., 1 F. App'x 420 (6th Cir. 2001), the second actor was
frequently warned about the extreme danger of not having working brakes on a street
sweeper which was used to clean roads, including steep hills, yet did nothing. In our case,
the KNS employee attempted to fix the bracket after he saw the damage and thought he
had fixed the problem. And another KNS witness explained that he did not take any
immediate action because 1) he did not think anyone would be working in that area, and 2)
he did not consider the situation dangerous.
Lastly, in Hennigan v. Atl. Refining Co., 232 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Pa. 1967), the jury
found the second actor's actions, in this case the City of Philadelphia, "so grossly negligent
as to amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of others." In this case, KNS's actions
could be characterized as negligent, but not grossly negligent or reckless.
4.

Key Lessons on Intervening Cause.
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The key lessons learned from the above discussion is that each case is unique and
must be examined using this two-step process.
First, the court must apply the correct legal standard. In Utah, a subsequent act will
only be an intervening act if such act is in hindsight "extraordinary" or "highly
extraordinary" as discussed in Harris.
Second, the court must evaluate the facts under the "extraordinary"/"highly
extraordinary" standard. In this case, a court errs in granting summary judgment if a
reasonable jury could conclude that KNS's actions as discussed above were not
"extraordinary". The Woods submit that most jurors would agree with the Woods that not
only were KNS's actions not "extraordinary" but expected under the circumstances and
consistent with human nature.
CONCLUSION
The Woods request this Court reverse the lower court's decision and 1) find
UPS owed a duty to the Plaintiffs, and 2) remand the case with instructions for the
intervening cause issue to go to a jury.
DATED this 1st day of October, 2018.
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